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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A. 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and 
DAVID L. MILLS, 
Defendant and 
Appellant 
Case No. 940324-CA 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issues 
1. The trial court abused its discretion as a matter of 
law when it refused to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty 
plea where Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was 
not strictly complied with at the time the plea was accepted by 
the court. 
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2. The trial court abused its discretion when it refused 
to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty plea for good cause 
where evidence was presented to the court showing that Mr, Mills' 
plea was entered involuntarily and under coercion or duress due 
to the "package deal" nature of the plea bargain and the fact 
that Mr. Mills was pressured and threatened by codefendants. 
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II. Standard of Review 
A plea of guilty may be withdrawn "only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2) (a) (1953 as amended). A trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw the plea may be overturned if it clearly 
appears that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. 
Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah App. 1994). The trial court has 
abused its discretion as a matter of law if it does not permit a 
defendant to withdraw a plea that was not made in strict 
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Id., quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Defendant attempted to preserve the first issue in the trial 
court. (Withdrawal of Plea Transcript at 16). However, whether 
or not the issue was preserved in the trial court is of no 
consequence for this Court, for "[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 challenge to 
the voluntariness of a plea to be considered for the first time 
on appeal." State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah App. 
1990), See also State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 
App. 1989) . 
Defendant preserved the second issue of voluntariness 
3 
throughout the entire record of the hearing before the trial 
court on defendant's Motion to Withdraw Pleas. (See, e.g., 
Withdrawal of Plea Transcript at 3). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves fairly straight forward circumstances and 
arises from the trial court's denial of defendant David L. 
Mills' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two criminal 
offenses. 
The first issues deals with non-compliance with Rule 11, of 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has previously 
ruled that a trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 
11 in accepting a guilty or no contest plea constitutes good 
cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea. 
Furthermore, strict Rule 11 compliance must be demonstrated on 
the record at the time the guilty or no contest plea is entered. 
State v. Smith, supra, at 3. This court must decide whether, 
based on the record, Rule 11 was strictly complied with at the 
time Mr. Mills entered his guilty plea. 
Even if this Court finds that Rule 11 was strictly complied 
with, this Court must decide whether Mr. Mills' guilty plea was 
entered voluntarily, which is the second issue. Mr. Mills 
alleges that his plea was entered under duress and coercion 
because of the nature of a "package deal" plea bargain (which was 
available only if all of the codefendants accepted it) and the 
fact that he was not allowed to be tried separately from those 
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codefendants. Mr. Mills claims that he feared retaliation from 
the other defendants if he did not accept the plea bargain, and 
therefore that his plea was entered under duress and because of 
coercion and thus the plea was involuntarily. The all-or-none 
nature of the plea agreement was not brought to the attention of 
the trial court by the prosecutor, and Mr. Mills was never 
questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea. This Court must 
decide (1) if the trial court's failure to question Mr. Mills as 
to the voluntariness of his plea in violation of Rule 11(e)(2), 
the trial court's failure to obtain a waiver from the defendant 
of his fundamental constitutional rights in violation of 
11(e)(3), the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of 
the nature and elements of the offenses in disregard of 11(e)(4), 
and the trial court's lack of knowledge of the terms of the plea 
bargain, which violates 11(e)(6), amounts to good cause as a 
matter of law to allow withdrawal of the pleas, or (2) if the 
trial court, when presented with evidence of Mr. Mills' claims at 
the withdrawal hearing, abused its discretion in ruling that good 
cause did not exist to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. 
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II. Course of the Proceedings and Dispositions Below 
On January 5, 1994 the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the County of Sanpete, 
State of Utah, at the Central Utah Correctional Facility in 
Gunnison, Utah, bound defendant Mr, David Mills over for trial on 
one count of riot and one count of injuring a jail. (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript at 88-89). Defendants Jeffery Eaton, Michael 
Bradley, Philip Bolin and Michael Land were bound over on various 
charges at the same time. (Id.) The trial court ordered all 
defendants to stand trial together. (Id. at 91). 
On March 21, 1994 defendants Eaton, Land and Mills were 
present for a jury trial before the same Judge and in the same 
location as the preliminary hearing. (See Trial Transcript). A 
jury was empaneled and sworn, and a recess was called. (Id. at 
12). Following the recess but without the jury present, the 
trial court heard a motion for discovery from defendant, and a 
motion in limine from plaintiff, ruled on the motions, and 
another recess was called. (Id. at pp. 17-27). Following this 
recess, without any testimony or evidence being presented, a 
resolution of the cases was reached whereby defendants entered 
guilty pleas to amended charges. (Id. at 28). Mr. Mills plead 
guilty to one count of attempt to riot, a class A misdemeanor and 
one count of attempt to injure a jail, a class A misdemeanor. 
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(Id. at 34-35). Mr. Mills and the other defendants were 
sentenced on that same day. (Id. at 3 6-38). 
On April 18, 1994 defendant filed a timely Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Pleas together with an Affidavit of David L. 
Mills and Memorandum in Support of the Motion. (Attached hereto 
as exhibit "A"). On May 4th, 1994 at the Sanpete County 
Courthouse in Manti, Utah, oral arguments concerning defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea were made before Judge Tibbs. 
(Withdrawal of Plea Transcript). After hearing testimony from 
Mr. Mills as well as the other defendants in the case, Judge 
Tibbs denied defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. (Id. at 
17). 
Mr. Mills now brings this appeal challenging the trial 
court/s refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. His 
Notice of Appeal (attached hereto as Exhibit HB") dated May 25, 
1994 was timely filed. 
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III. Statement of Facts 
On August 9, 1993 there was a disturbance at the Central 
Utah Correctional Facility in Gunnison, Utah which involved a 
large number of inmates behaving in a riotous fashion and 
injuring the facility. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript). A 
total of Twenty-one inmates were charged for offenses arising 
from the incident. One group of five inmates were charged as 
codefendants in the case at bar. These five codefendants were 
brought before the court for the purpose of determining whether 
probable cause existed to bind them over for trial on a variety 
of charges stemming from the riot incident. (Id. at 4). 
Defendants Phillip J. Bolin, Michael J. Bradley, Jeffery E. 
Eaton, and Michael A. Land were present at the hearing and 
represented by Douglas L. Neeley. fid, at 2). Defendant David 
L. Mills, the appellant in this action, was present and 
represented by Jeffery P. Gleave. (Id.) At the conclusion of 
the evidentiary portion of the preliminary hearing, the trial 
court ordered defendants bound over to stand trial on charges as 
follows: Phillip Bolin on riot, possession of a dangerous weapon 
at a correctional facility, and attempted escape; Michael Bradley 
on riot; Jeffery Eaton on riot, and possession of a dangerous 
weapon at a correctional facility; Michael Land on riot and 
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attempted escape; and David Mills on riot and injuring a jail, 
fid, at 88-89). 
Following the trial court's ruling on the issue of probable 
cause, Mr. Gleave moved the court to sever the defendants for 
purposes of trial, (Id. at 90). Mr. Gleave explained (1) that 
there would be conflicts in defense tactics in that Mr. Mills 
wished to use video tapes as evidence that the other defendants 
would oppose; (2) that the sheer number of defendants would 
likely prejudice a jury in a trial on the charge of riot; and (3) 
that all defendants were not charged with the same counts. (Id.) 
Mr. Neeley concurred on the motion. (Id. at 90-91). Without 
elaboration, the trial court denied the motion to sever. (Id. at 
91). 
A jury trial commenced on March 21, 1994 on the charges 
against Jeffery Eaton, Michael Land and David Mills. (Jury Trial 
Transcript). (The other two defendants settled their cases prior 
to this date.) Though a jury was empaneled, no testimony was 
heard by the jury because plaintiff and defendants reached an 
agreement whereby defendants would plead guilty to amended 
charges. (Id. at 28). The resolution followed a recess of 
approximately 45 minutes, and occurred in response to the trial 
courts earlier rulings on motions by both sides. (Id.) 
Jeffery Eaton's charges were amended to one Class-A 
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Misdemeanor charge of attempted riot, and one Class-A Misdemeanor 
charge of attempting to injure a jail. (Id. at 29). Michael 
Land's charges were amended to one Class-A Misdemeanor charge of 
attempted riot, and one attempted escape charge reduced to a 
Class-A Misdemeanor. (Id. at 29-30). David Mills' charges were 
amended to one Class-A Misdemeanor charge of attempted riot, and 
one Class-A Misdemeanor charge of attempting to injure a jail. 
(Id. at 29). Thus, all three defendants' charges were reduced to 
two Class-A Misdemeanors. Mr. Mills pled guilty to both counts, 
and such pleas were accepted by the court. fid, at 3 4-35)• 
Defendants waived their statutory right to defer sentencing, and 
were sentenced immediately. (Id. at 36). The trial court 
sentenced each of the defendants to the Sanpete County Jail for a 
term of one year on each count, sentences to run concurrently 
with each other and with the sentences that defendant's were 
already serving. (Id, at 38-39). 
David Mills was never informed, on March 21, 1994 when he 
entered his guilty pleas, of many of the various fundamental 
constitutional rights that he was waiving and other information 
contemplated in Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The trial court's only reference to constitutional 
rights was to refer to previous matters. (Trial Transcript at 
33). The court engaged in no specific colloquy with Mr. Mills or 
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any other defendant regarding Rule 11(e) requirements. 
Specifically, at no time on that date was Mr. Mills informed by 
the court of (1) the nature and elements of the crimes to which 
he pled guilty, nor was there a plea affidavit prepared or 
executed; (2) constitutional rights that the defendant would be 
waiving if he plead guilty; or (3) whether Mr. Mills' plea was 
voluntary. Finally, the trial court was not informed of the 
"package deal" nature of the plea bargain. 
On April 18, 1994 defendant David Mills filed a timely 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto). On May 4, 1994 oral arguments were heard before the 
trial court on the motion to withdraw. (Withdrawal of Plea 
Transcript). David Mills, Jeffery Eaton and Michael Land each 
testified at the hearing. (Id. at 2). The following facts were 
elicited by the testimony: 
1. The plea bargain that was offered to Mr. Mills and the 
other defendants was a "package deal" which was conditioned upon 
acceptance by all defendants as a group. (Withdrawal of Plea 
Transcript at 5-6, 12). The prosecutor did not bring the 
all-or-none nature of the agreement to the attention of the court 
at the time the pleas were taken. 
2. Mr. Mills did not want to accept the plea bargain offer 
because he did not believe it to be in his best interest. (Id. 
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at 6). He did not feel that the bargain would substantially 
benefit him or provide for any earlier release from prison. (Id. 
at 8) . 
3. Codefendant Jeffery Eaton was particularly desirous of 
accepting a plea bargain since he feared significant extension of 
his sentence if he lost at trial. (Id. at 11-12, 14). In 
addition to the riot charges, Mr. Eaton was facing trial on the 
more serious charge of possession of a dangerous weapon at a 
correctional facility, a second degree felony. (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript at 88-89 and Addendum Exhibit "C"). 
Codefendant Michael Land also felt he stood to gain from the plea 
bargain in terms of time served in prison. (Withdrawal of Plea 
Transcript at 14-15). 
4. Mr. Mills felt pressured to accept the plea bargain 
against his desire by the requirements of the "Court attorney" 
(Sanpete County Attorney), his codefendants' attorney, Douglas 
Neeley, and his codefendants, which made him feel that he could 
not get a fair trial. (Id. at 6, 14). Mr. Mills' codefendants 
told him that various members of the jury were personally related 
to officers at the Gunnison Correctional Facility. Additionally, 
codefendants' counsel Mr. Neeley told Mr. Mills that the jurors 
would be prejudiced against him if he went to trial. (Id.) 
5. Mr. Mills also felt pressured by the fact that the plea 
13 
bargain offer was an all-or-none deal. (Id. at 6, 14). He 
feared, based on his codefendants' actions and statements, that 
there would be physical and mental retaliation from them if he 
were to refuse to accept the offer and thereby preclude its 
availability to the others. (Id.) 
6. Mr. Mills' fear of retaliation was also based on 
knowledge of common custom among prison inmates that retaliation 
is possible in such circumstances. (Id. at 10-11). Mr. Eaton 
testified that because of unstated rules of prison life, one need 
not verbalize a specific threat in order for it to be realized. 
(Id. at 13). 
7. Mr. Mills inquired intro whether he could plead no 
contest, but was told that such a plea would not be acceptable, 
and that his attempt to enter such a plea would defeat the plea 
bargain for all defendants. (Id. at 7). 
8. Based on his fear of retaliation together with the 
coercive remarks by codefendants' counsel Neeley and the 
codefendants themselves, Mr. Mills accepted the plea bargain and 
entered his guilty pleas. (Id. at 7) . 
9. The record indicates no inquiry at the time the pleas 
were taken from the trial judge as to whether Mr. Mills' pleas 
were voluntary. (Id. at 7; see also Jury Trial Transcript at 
33-36). Mr. Mills did not offer his concerns to the court 
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because the other defendants were physically present and would 
know that he was defeating the plea bargain. (Withdrawal of Plea 
Transcript at 7). Nor did Mr. Mills inform his attorney Mr. 
Gleave of his fear of retaliation. (Id. at 9). 
10. The record is without any reference to the nature and 
elements of the offenses the defendant pled to, nor is there any 
reference in the record that Mr. Mill's pleas were an admission 
of all those elements. 
11. The record is devoid of any waiver by Mr. Mills of his 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Mr. Mills 
incriminated himself when he plead guilty to two offenses. Jury 
Trial Transcript at 34, 35). 
The trial court denied Mr. Mills' motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas, and this appeal was filed. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Recent controlling Utah case law makes clear that, where a 
criminal defendant expresses the intent to enter a guilty plea, 
the trial judge must enter into a detailed colloquy with the 
defendant under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to ensure that the defendant is fully informed of his fundamental 
constitutional rights and other important information. Such 
colloquy must occur at the time the plea is accepted by the trial 
court. 
The Rule 11 requirements function to ensure that the 
defendant's plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily, and the 
Rule must therefore be strictly followed. Failure to strictly 
comply with any of requirements of Rule 11(e) with the defendant 
at the time of plea amounts to good cause as a matter of law to 
allow the defendant to later withdraw his plea. 
In this case, the relevant record clearly reflects that Rule 
11(e) was not strictly complied with at the time Mr. Mills 
entered his guilty pleas. In fact, little Rule 11(e) colloquy 
was engaged in by the trial judge. Specifically, Mr. Mills was 
never informed of the specific elements and nature of the crimes 
to which he pled guilty, and the fact that the State would have 
to prove each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor 
was he questioned as to the voluntariness of his pleas. Mr. 
16 
Mills did not waive his constitutional rights against self-
incrimination prior to entering the two guilty pleas, and 
finally, the trial court was not informed of the nature of the 
plea agreement. The failure to strictly comply with these 
requirements deprives the defendant of fundamental constitutional 
rights to which he is entitled. 
In short, the trial court simply failed to ensure, by way of 
questioning, colloquy, and affidavit, that Mr. Mills' pleas were 
voluntary or that Mr. Mills understood the nature and elements of 
the offense to which his pleas were entered or that he waived his 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Such 
circumstances clearly represent good cause as a matter of law for 
allowing withdrawal of the guilty pleas and therefore, the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Mills' motion to 
withdraw those guilty pleas. 
Even where Rule 11 is strictly followed, a defendant's plea 
may be entered involuntarily, and thus should be allowed to be 
withdrawn. One such situation contemplated by case law and the 
purpose behind Rule 11 is where the plea is the product of 
coercion or threat, or is entered under duress. Federal courts 
have drawn specific attention to "package deal" plea bargains as 
situations where coercion is especially likely to occur. As 
such, courts have held that the trial court's responsibility of 
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ensuring voluntariness of pleas is heightened in such situations 
and a more intensive and comprehensive examination and colloquy 
by the trial judge is necessary. 
Mr. Mills demonstrated by testimony before the trial court 
that the posturing of the case and various other coercive 
circumstances caused him to fear physical and mental retaliation 
if he refused to enter the guilty plea. 
Firstly, the trial court refused Mr. Mills' motion to sever 
the five defendants and allow him to stand trial alone, despite 
the fact that he was faced with different charges that would call 
for defensive strategies at odds with the other defendants, and 
that the plurality of defendants would itself tend to prejudice 
him on the charge of riot. 
Secondly, comments made by the other defendants and their 
counsel at trial about a hostile jury caused Mr. Mills to believe 
that he would not receive a fair trial. 
Thirdly, the plea bargain offered at trial was a "package 
deal" conditioned on acceptance by all defendants, despite the 
fact that their charges varied, and Mr. Mills did not stand to 
benefit in terms of prison time while the other defendants did. 
Because the other defendants desired to accept the plea bargain, 
and would be precluded from doing so if Mr. Mills did not accept, 
Mr. Mills feared he would suffer physical and mental retaliation 
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in prison if he refused to plead guilty. 
Collectively, these factors demonstrate that Mr. Mills' 
guilty plea was entered involuntarily, under duress and coercion, 
and therefore that good cause was before the trial court to allow 
Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Therefore, the trial court's denial of Mr. Mills' motion, 
was therefore an abuse of discretion, and this Court should 
vacate the decision and remand to the trial court with 
instructions to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his pleas. 
19 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e). 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns 
the taking of guilty pleas, and places numerous requirements on 
trial courts where a guilty plea is received. These important 
requirements stem from the fundamental nature of the 
constitutional rights that a defendant waives when entering a 
guilty plea, and the advantages and options that he must forego. 
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment 
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in 
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a 
full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequences• 
Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea by 
showing good cause, and with leave of the court. U.C.A. 
77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended). 
A trial court has abused its discretion as a matter of law 
if it does not permit a defendant to withdraw a plea that was not 
taken in strict compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
App. 1994), citing State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). fl[A] trial 
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in accepting a 
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guilty or no contest plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of 
law, for the withdrawal of that plea." Smith at 476. "It is 
critical • . . that strict Rule 11 compliance be demonstrated on 
the record at the time the guilty or no contest plea is entered.11 
Smith at 477, 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) is the sentinel 
Utah case on the issue of compliance with Rule 11(e) when 
accepting a guilty plea. In that case, Gibbons pled guilty to 
various charges at his arraignment. The trial court engaged in a 
fairly extensive dialogue with Gibbons, discussing the contents 
of the information, various rights that he would waive, and 
questioning him as to the voluntariness of his plea. Id. at 
1310-11. On appeal, Gibbons complained that the trial court 
failed to adequately inform him of the elements of the crimes 
charged. 
The Utah Supreme Court proceeded to issue "a statement of 
the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts 
in this state . . . ." Id. at 1312. The Court formed its 
"statement" with rulings of the United States Supreme Court: 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered." Id., citing Bovkin 
v. Alabama. The Court went on to provide a lengthy list of what 
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a proper plea affidavit should contain. However, the Court also 
made clear that even where such an affidavit is used, the trial 
judge must personally "review the statements in the affidavit 
with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements [under 
Rule 11] on the record before accepting the guilty plea." Id. at 
1314. 
The Court in explanation of the requirement that the 
defendant understand the elements of the offense to which he 
pleads cites Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 
L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) wherein it is stated that "clearly the plea 
could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an 
intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the 
defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge 
against him, the first, and most universally recognized, 
requirement of due process. Id. at 645 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 
312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 85 L.Ed 859 (1941). 
In addition, the Court citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) stated that "the 
factual elements of the charges against the defendant must be 
explained in the taking of a guilty plea so that the defendant 
understands and admits those elements: [B]ecause a guilty plea 
is an admission of all of the elements of a formal criminal 
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charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant 
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. . 
." Id. at 466. 
The Court parted with the admonition that, "[t]his procedure 
may take additional time, but constitutional rights may not be 
sacrificed in the name of judicial economy." Gibbons, at 1314. 
In State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 (Utah App. 1990) the trial 
court failed to inform the defendant entered a guilty plea on 
the day of trial, waived the two-day minimum for sentencing, and 
was sentenced immediately. Id. at 772-73. The trial judge 
failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 in much the same manner as 
the case at bar. In that case, the trial judge engaged in a 
colloquy with Pharris regarding the consequences of the guilty 
plea. Id. at 773. Pharris was unsatisfied with the sentence and 
moved to withdraw his plea, his motion was denied, and Pharris 
appealed. 
This Court vacated Pharris7 conviction and remanded the case 
to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. The 
Court held that despite the fact that Pharris signed a plea 
affidavit detailing the subjects under Rule 11, and engaged in a 
colloquy with defendant in regards to the same, the court's 
inquiry nonetheless failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 in 
three regards: 
23 
First, the trial court did not as required by [Rule 11] 
inform defendant at the time the plea was taken that he-
waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination 
by pleading guilty to the offense. 
* * * 
Next, the trial court made no inquiry on the record 
concerning defendant's understanding of the nature and 
elements of the offenses as required by [Rule 11]. 
* * * 
Finally, the trial court failed to review the possible 
punishment with defendant as required by [Rule 11]. 
Id. at 777. This Court summed up the current status of the law1 
in its the final paragraph of the decision: 
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test, before accepting 
the guilty plea, the trial court must review on the record 
with the defendant at the time the plea is taken the nature 
and elements of the offense, the constitutional rights 
articulated in Rule 11 which he waives by pleading guilty, 
and the allowable penalties. 
Id. at 778, emphasis added. See U.S. v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 80 
(1st Cir. 1987) ("Our conclusion [that a later hearing cannot 
replace a full inquiry into voluntariness at the time the plea is 
entered] reflects a prophylactic legal consideration, namely, the 
desirability . . . of creating a full record the first time, . . 
xIt should be noted that the recent case of State v. Truiillo-Martinez, 
814 P.2d 596 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), is at 
odds with the ruling in Pharris, supra. at 3, regarding the "entire record" 
approach. Truiillo-Martinez suggests that the test is not so strict as the 
other cases suggest, and that certain minor oversights in the trial judge's 
plea colloquy may be remedied by the signing of a complete affidavit. 
However, this disagreement is immaterial as applied to the present case 
because Mr. Mills did not sign a plea affidavit that could have compensated 
for the lack of investigation and colloquy by the trial judge. Moreover, it 
should be noted that even in Trui illo-Martinez the trial judge engaged in a 
much more thorough Rule 11 colloquy than in the present case. See id. at 
597-98. 
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. .") citing McCarthy v. United States, at 465, (noting that the 
procedures established in Rule 11 are "intended to produce a 
complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors 
relevant to this voluntariness determination.11); United States v. 
Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an 
appellate court should confine its review to the record of the 
plea proceeding); See also United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 
166 170 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 870, 54 
L.Ed.2d 149 (1977). 
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989) is also on 
point. There, as in the present case, the trial court relied 
simply on a cursory and conclusory inquiry in accepting the 
defendant7s guilty plea. This Court found such inquiry "wholly 
inadequate under [Rule 11]." Id. at 1334. The Court held that a 
specific and detailed inquiry is necessary, and that "[m]ere 
general questions which ask whether a plea is 'voluntary' are 
insufficient under [Rule 11]." Id. at 1335. 
In the present case, it is without question that the trial 
court failed in at least the same extent as in Pharris and 
Valencia to fully comply with Rule 11 on the record. The trial 
judge engaged in virtually no dialogue with Mr. Mills in regard 
to the implications of his entering guilty pleas. The record of 
the proceedings at the time the plea was taken contains no 
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mention of specific constitutional rights. The record does not 
evidence Mr. Mills' waiver of his constitutional rights against 
self-incrimination. Nor does it contain any inquiry by the court 
as to whether Mr. Mills understood the nature and elements of the 
offenses. Neither is there any evidence that the court 
questioned whether the pleas were entered voluntarily. 
Gibbons, Smith, and Pharris all make clear that even where a 
detailed plea affidavit is used to strictly cover all of the Rule 
11 concerns and the affidavit is explained by a defendant's 
attorney, failure of the trial court to further question the 
defendant on all subjects at the time the plea is taken 
represents cause to vacate a decision not to allow defendant to 
withdraw his plea. Reliance on affidavits or previous hearings 
alone is clearly insufficient. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238 at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709 at 1712; Pharris, 798 P.2d at 777; 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314, In the present case no affidavit was 
used, and the colloquy and examination by the court would 
therefore be even more important. Nor may the trial judge rely 
on defense counsel to fully inform the defendant of Rule 11 
considerations:2 
There is some suggestion in the record that the trial judge was relying 
on Mr. Mills' counsel to inform and question his client. 
THE COURT: Well, you were present. Didn't I ask you at one 
time if there was any reason why I should not sentence them? 
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Because of the importance of compliance with [Rule 11] and 
Boykin, the law places the burden of es t ab l i sh ing compliance 
with those requirements on the t r i a l judge. I t i s not 
su f f i c i en t to assume tha t defense a t torneys make sure t ha t 
t h e i r c l i e n t s fully understand the contents of the 
a f f i d a v i t . 
Id . a t 1313. See also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650, 96 
S.Ct. 2253, 2260, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). In t h i s case the 
record c l e a r l y demonstrates t ha t Rule 11(e) was not s t r i c t l y 
followed, and t h i s Court should therefore vacate the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s decis ion and remand with ins t ruc t ions to allow Mr. Mills 
t o withdraw h i s gu i l ty p leas . 
MR. GLEAVE: Yes , you d i d , Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You told me there was no reason; isn't that what 
you told me? 
MR. GLEAVE: Yes , I b e l i e v e I d i d . 
Withdrawal of Plea transcript at 16-17. The Court made further reference to 
having waited "while this matter they went over and advised al l the rights." 
[sic] Id. To the extent the court was relying on the attorneys, such 
reliance was insufficient as a matter of law. 
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II. Mr. Mills' plea was entered involuntarily/ under duress, 
and coercion, due to the "package deal" nature of the plea 
bargain and the fact that Mr. Mills was pressured and 
threatened by codefendants. 
Even if a trial court strictly complies with Rule 11(e), it 
may abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a defendant to 
withdraw his plea. While adherence to Rule 11(e) requirements 
may create a presumption that the plea was entered voluntarily, 
"compliance with Rule 11 does not foreclose the possibility the 
court abused its discretion in refusing defendant's motion if his 
plea was in fact involuntary." State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 
748 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
"Good cause exists where the plea was made involuntarily." State 
v. Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme 
Court elaborated, in Forsyth, that "for a plea of guilty to be 
valid it must appear that the accused . . . without undue 
influence, coercion, or improper inducement voluntarily entered 
such plea." Id. at 338-39. 
While Utah courts have had little opportunity to expand on 
the principles alluded to in Forsyth, federal courts offer useful 
guidance in applying a very similar Rule 11. A look to Federal 
cases elucidates how an insufficient colloquy at the trial court 
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level, especially with regard to questioning a defendant as to 
whether his plea is voluntarily entered, is good cause to allow a 
defendant to withdraw his plea at a later date. (See discussion 
at p. 21, 22, supra.) The determination of voluntariness is 
fl[a]t the core" of Rule 11. Mack v. United States, 635 F.2d 20, 
23 (1st Cir. 1980). 
Moreover, Federal cases specifically call attention to the 
issue of "package-deal" plea bargains which condition the 
acceptance of the bargain on agreement by all codefendants. In 
such cases, a trial court should be suspicious that a plea may 
have been coerced, and must be extra careful and thorough in 
questioning each defendant with regard to the voluntariness of 
his plea. See Bordenkircher v. Haves, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8, 98 
S.Ct. 663, 668 n.8, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); United States v. 
Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 398 (1st Cir. 1978), aff'd, 576 F.2d 396 
(1978); United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, (1st Cir. 1987). 
The very recent decision in U.S. v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th 
Cir. 1993) involved a plea with very similar circumstances as the 
case at bar. In that case, Caro pled guilty along with three 
other defendants pursuant to a "package deal" plea agreement. 
The court was quick to point out the potential problems with such 
agreements: 
Consistent with the nature of the agreement, defendants7 
fates are often bound together: If one defendant backs out, 
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the deal's off for everybody. This may well place 
additional pressure on each of the participants to go along 
with the deal despite misgivings they might have. 
Id. at 658-59. In fact, as in the present case, Caro claimed 
that the nature of the agreement had subjected him to coercion in 
that his codefendants had pressured him into going along with the 
deal when he did not wish to. Id. at 659. However, the 
district court refused Caros' motion to withdraw his plea based 
on such concerns. 
On appeal, the 9th Circuit vacated the decision. The court 
first called attention to the fact that the government failed to 
disclose the nature of the agreement to the district court at the 
time the plea was taken. The court found such circumstances 
violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2) which 
requires disclosure of the agreement in open court. The court 
referred to the interpretation of Rule 11(e)(2) in Daniels: 
"Rule 11(e)(2) requires 'disclosure of the [plea] agreement,7 and 
that means that 'the parties are required to inform the trial 
judge of all the promises that have been made, not only those 
which they happen to consider important.'" 821 F.2d at 80, 
(quoting United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C.Cir. 
1977)); accord United States v, Blackner, 721 F.2d 703, 708 (10th 
Cir. 1983). (Utah's Rule 11(e)(6) has the same requirements as 
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Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 
(Exhibit "G") and the principles related in Daniels should apply 
similarly.) 
The court did not stop at pointing out the Rule 11 
violations, but went on to express the importance of the trial 
court's heightened examination of defendant's plea in such 
circumstances: "We, in turn, have recognized that 'the trial 
court should make a more careful examination of the voluntariness 
of a plea when [it might have been] induced by . . . threats or 
promises' from a third party." Caro, 997 F.2d at 659 (quoting 
United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1254, 104 S.Ct. 3540, 82 L.Ed.2d 844 
(1984)). In the end, the court based its decision on the fact 
that: 
the district court was not aware of the package nature of 
the deal, [and] its voluntariness inquiry was not the 'more 
careful examination' of voluntariness our precedents require 
when a plea bargain is conditioned on the cooperation of 
more than one defendant. 
Caro, 997 F.2d at 660, citing Castello, Id. at 815. 
The facts and considerations in Caro, are strikingly similar 
to what has occurred in the present case. Mr. Mills plea 
Utah Rule 11(e)(6) requires that the court find: "if the tendered plea 
is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
agreement has been reached." 
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agreement was a "package deal," conditioned on acceptance by all 
of the defendants. Mr. Mills testified that he never did wish to 
accept any of the plea bargains offered by the prosecutor at 
various stages of the proceedings. Mr. Mills did not accept a 
bargain offered prior to the trial date, which was accepted by 
two other defendants. Nor did he wish to accept the ostensibly 
"better" bargain offered immediately following the court's ruling 
in chambers on parties' preliminary motions. Unlike the other 
defendant's, Mr. Mills felt that he stood to gain little by 
pleading guilty. He did not believe that either his time in 
prison or his likelihood of parole would be affected by the plea. 
However, the prosecutor and the trial court had put Mr. 
Mills in an extremely difficult and potentially dangerous 
position. 
Firstly, the court had not allowed Mr. Mills to be tried 
separately from the other defendants, despite the fact that the 
variety of charges did not all apply to Mills, that his defense 
would likely require tactics that conflicted with other 
defendants defenses, and that the sheer number of defendants 
could prejudice Mills on the charge of rioting. 
Secondly, and most importantly, the prosecutor conditioned 
the plea bargain on acceptance by all defendants. If Mills were 
to refuse to accept the offer, and not plead guilty to the 
32 
reduced charges, all defendants would have to stand trial. 
As was the case in Caro, Mr. Mills codefendants Jeffery 
Eaton and Michael Land were eager to accept the plea bargain 
offered on the day of trial. The "bargain" was not strictly 
balanced, in that Mr. Eaton stood to gain more by pleading his 
second degree felony charge down to a class A misdemeanor, 
whereas Mr. Land and Mr. Mills were charged with nothing higher 
than a third degree felony. Yet all three defendants would plead 
guilty to the same level of offenses. By accepting the offer, 
both of Mr. Mills' codefendants believed they would receive 
earlier parole dates. In the presence of Mr. Mills they and 
their attorney Mr. Neeley made it clear that they wished to 
accept the plea offer. They even, by their remarks and 
representations, attempted to create the belief in Mr. Mills that 
he could not receive a fair trial because the jury was already 
biased against him. 
Because the court had refused to let Mr. Mills be severed 
from the others for purposes of trial, and because the prosecutor 
conditioned the plea bargain on acceptance by all of the 
defendants, Mr. Mills knew that his refusal to accept the offer 
would operate to the disadvantage and significant consternation 
of the codefendant's. This is precisely the sort of situation 
the Caro court warned of with regard to "package deals": 
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Quite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the 
package deal than his codefendant(s); looking out for his 
own best interests, the lucky one may try to force his 
codefendant(s) into going along with the deal. The Supreme 
Court has therefore observed that tying defendants' plea 
decisions together "might pose a greater danger of inducing 
a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a 
defendant must consider. 
Caro, 997 F.2d at 659, (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
at 368 n.8, 98 S.Ct. at 668 n.8.) Indeed, in this case it did. 
Mr. Mills then began to fear for his safety. With all 
defendants constantly present and voicing their eagerness to 
accept the plea offer, Mr. Mills knew that a refusal on his part 
would make them angry. Though no one verbally threatened Mr. 
Mills directly, he had good reason to believe that if he made the 
other defendant's stand trial by refusing to plead guilty, he 
could be in serious danger of mental and physical retaliation. 
As defendant Eaton himself testified, in the prison environment 
direct threats are unnecessary—there are "unsaid rules . . . 
that all prisoners know automatically." (Withdrawal of Plea 
Transcript at 13). It is significant that this candid 
acknowledgement of an environment of implicit threat comes from 
Mr. Eaton, who was bound over on a charge of possessing a 
dangerous weapon (a "shank" or fashioned knife) in his cell, a 
second degree felony, which was ultimately reduced under the plea 
agreement to a class A misdemeanor. 
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In this case, just as in Caro, the prosecutor failed to 
inform the trial judge of the "package deal" nature of the plea 
agreement, as was his responsibility. (See Caro, 997 F.2d at 659 
n.2.) Thus, Rule 11(e)(6) was similarly violated. Moreover, and 
perhaps because of the failure to inform, the trial judge engaged 
in no colloquy or examination in regard to the voluntariness of 
Mr. Mills' plea, a violation of Rule 11(e)(2). Either Rule 11(e) 
violations amount to good cause to withdraw the guilty plea as a 
matter of law. (See argument above.) Additionally, the 
shortcomings necessarily amount to a failure to meet the 
heightened level of examination necessary in "package deal" cases 
as discussed in Caro. 
The circumstances in the present case created in Mr. Mills' 
mind a reasonable and justified fear of retaliation if he were to 
refuse to accept the plea bargain and proceed to trial as was his 
desire. Moreover, the fact that all defendant's were constantly 
in each other's presence during the period of time between the 
offering of the plea bargain and the entering of the guilty plea 
effectively precluded Mr. Mills from communicating his fears to 
his counsel or the court.4 The timely entry of his motion to 
4Not that such failure on Mr. Mills part is critical. The Washington 
Supreme Court, relying on the federal courts, has recognized the Catch-22 
nature of this situation, even where defendants deny improper influence before 
the trail court. State v. Frederick, 674 P.2d 136, 140 n.3 (Wash. 1983); and 
see Blackledqe v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 
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withdraw the plea evidences that, as soon as he could effectively 
convey his fears to counsel outside the presence of the 
codefendants, he did so. 
The upshot is that Mr. Mills' guilty plea was made under 
coercion, duress, and fear, and was therefore clearly not 
voluntary. Accordingly, Mr. Mills should have been allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea, and the trial court's refusal to allow 
him to do so was unreasonable and an abuse of the trial courts 
sound discretion. This court should vacate the decision and 
remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to allow 
Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. 
136 (1977); Camillo v. Wvrick, 640 F.2d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 1981) 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the arguments above and the evidence in this 
case, this Court should find that David Mills' guilty pleas were 
entered involuntarily and that he should be allowed to withdraw 
them. 
Rule 11(e) was not complied with at the time the pleas were 
entered since the trial court failed to: (1) inform Mr. Mills of 
the nature and elements of the offenses to which he pled guilty, 
(2) the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of Mr. Mills' 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination at the time of 
the pleas, (3) the trial court was not informed of the prior plea 
agreement at the time of the pleas, and (4) the trial court 
failed to find that the pleas were voluntarily made. A finding 
of any of the above deficiencies provides good cause as a matter 
of law for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea. 
Mr. Mills pleas were not voluntary and violates Rule 
11(e)(2), since he was coerced and pressured into entering them 
by the "package deal" plea bargain which put him in the position 
of either entering the guilty pleas or facing retaliation by his 
codefendants who wished to take advantage of the plea agreement. 
The trial court was not informed of the all-or-none nature 
of the plea bargain at the time the pleas were taken, which 
itself violates Rule 11(e)(6), and therefore could not 
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effectively question Mr. Mills to ensure that he was not unduly 
pressured into accepting the bargain. 
The record is completely void of any reference to the fact 
that Mr. Mills would waive certain fundamental rights by pleading 
guilty to the amended charges and the record is likewise 
completely barren of any reference to the nature and elements of 
the offenses to which Mr. Mills pled guilty. 
By demonstrating such facts, Mr. Mills has demonstrated good 
cause for allowing his pleas to be withdrawn, and the trial court 
abused its discretion when it ruled otherwise. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the trial court's ruling 
below and should remand to the trial court with instructions to 
allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty pleas and stand trial 
alone. 
DATED this jAT day of December, 1994 
ML 
rir P. 
rtey f 
:e p Gleave 
irtiey or David Mi l l s 
A^e l lan t /de fendant 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 
A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas together with 
an Affidavit of David L. Mills and Memorandum 
in Support of the Motion 
B. Notice of Appeal 
C. Copy of Amended Information 
D. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
E. U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended) 
F. U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended) 
G. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2) 
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c/vniDi i JLL 
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6 390) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
: GUILTY PLEAS 
vs. : 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A, 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, : 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L. : Case No. 931600154 
MILLS, : 
Defendants. : JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney, 
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby moves the above-entitled court for an 
Order permitting the Defendant to withdraw the pleas of guilty to 
Attempted Riot a class A misdemeanor and Attempt to Injure a Jail 
a Class A misdemeanor. These pleas were entered on March 21, 
1994 and therefore motion is timely since the thirty (30) days 
permitted by U.C.A. 77-13-6 have not expired* 
As a basis for this Motion, it is the Defendant/s position 
that good cause exists to permit withdrawal of his guilty pleas. 
He alleges that his pleas were not voluntary but were entered to 
avoid retaliation from his Co-Defendants in this case. 
Specifically, there were three Co-Defendants remaining on March 
21, 1994 who had not previously plead guilty. The Sanpete County 
State v. Bolin, et al., 
Motion tor Withdraw Guilty Pleas 
Page 2 
Attorney offered to reduce the criminal charges facing these 
remaining Co-Defendants in a return for guilty pleas. 
The offers were conveyed to the Co-Defendants but not all 
were willing to accept the offered agreement. Subsequently, the 
Sanpete County Attorney placed a restriction on the offer that if 
all of the Co-Defendants did not accept the offer, then none of 
them would be permitted to accept it individually. 
The Defendant felt that because of the restriction placed on 
the offered agreement, if he had elected not to accept, then he 
would have been subjected to physical and emotional retaliation 
from the Co-Defendants, since they would not have been permitted 
to accept the plea bargain without his concurrence. (The 
Defendant executed an affidavit consistent with these statements 
and is attached as Exhibit A). 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that the Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Pleas be granted and permit the Defendant to be 
tried by a jury for the offenses charged against him. 
DATED this i,f* day of April, 1994. 
/&/>*'] 
jFE^V P. GLEAVE 
i£o;rney for Defendant 
David L. Mills 
r* 
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A. 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L. 
MILLS, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEAS 
Case No. 931600154 
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney, 
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby submits the following memorandum in 
support of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas* 
FACTS 
The Defendant along with four Codefendants were charged in 
an information with various criminal violations stemming from a 
disturbance at Central Utah Correctional Facility. Prior to the 
trial date, Phillip J. Bolin and Michael A. Bradley accepted plea 
bargains from the Sanpete County Attorney. The remaining three 
Codefendants did not accept the plea bargains which were offered 
but prepared to undergo a jury trial to determine their guilt or 
innocence. 
On March 21, 1994, the day the scheduled trial was to begin, 
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and after the jury venire was qualified, Judge Don V. Tibbs heard 
argument in his chambers concerning a Motion for a Protective 
Order filed by the Attorney General's Office of the State of 
Utah, After ruling on this motion, the Sanpete County Attorney 
offered a plea bargain that was substantially nbetterlfthan the 
original offer to the Defendants David L. Mills, Michael A. Land, 
and Jeffrey C. Eaton. 
This offer was not accepted by Michael A Land or David L 
Mills, Additional negotiations were undertaken by the 
Defendant's attorneys and the Sanpete County Attorney, While I 
(Jeffery P. Gleave) was discussing with the Defendant, David L. 
Mills, the modifications Mr. Blackham had offered to him, Mr. 
Douglas Neeley, the attorney for Defendants Eaton and Land 
returned to the room and announced that Mr. Blackham had stated 
that either all of the Defendants were required to accept the 
offered plea bargain or none of them would be permitted to accept 
it. 
The Defendant Jeffrey C. Eaton was facing trial on 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon at a Correctional Facility/ a 
second degree felony and Riot, a third degree felony. He was 
very desirous of accepting the plea bargain and pleading to two 
amended Class A misdemeanor counts and kept "encouraging" Mills 
and Land to accept the offered plea bargain. 
Eventually, all the Defendants plead guilty to the counts in 
the amended information on March 21, 1994. 
ARGUMENT 
A portion of the guarantees granted to all accused persons 
in criminal prosecutions, by Article I Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah, includes: the right to appear and defend 
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in person and by counsel, to testify in his own defense and the 
right to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury. It is well 
understood that the defendant may waive these rights if certain 
requirements are met. An important requirement that must be 
satisfied is that the waiver must be voluntary. 
To withdraw a guilty plea defendant must show good cause and 
with leave of the court. U.C.A. 77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended). 
Good cause exists where the plea was entered involuntarily. 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977). In Forsyth, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, "we are in full agreement with the 
proposition that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must appear 
that the accused had a clear understanding of the charge and 
without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement 
voluntarily entered such plea." Id. at 338-39. 
In the instant case, the Defendant was subjected to undue 
influence and coercion by his Codefendants and the Sanpete County 
Attorney because if he had stated he did not want to plead guilty 
to the amended information, the other Codefendants who desired to 
accept the "deal11 would not have been allowed to do so. 
In this case Defendant Mills, had made a Motion to Sever the 
Defendants for purposes of trial. However, this Motion had been 
denied and he was involuntarily placed in a position where he 
would stand trial not alone but with several other Defendants 
which he felt was not is his best interests. Furthermore, on 
March 21, 1994, he was placed in position where he was required 
to acquiesce in the offered bargain or suffer the consequences 
from his fellow Codefendants. 
Therefore, it seems apparent that by requiring the 
Defendants to collectively accept the offered plea bargain and if 
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not, prohibiting them from accepting it individually, that there 
was coercion and undue influence exerted on Defendant Mills to 
plead guilty to reduced charges. As stated in Forsyth, Id,, good 
cause exists to withdraw the plea if it was entered with either 
undue influence or coercion which would render the plea 
involuntary. Here it seems that both undue influence and 
coercion are present which makes the voluntariness of the plea 
doubly flawed. 
DATED this l$_ day of April, 1994, 
^FERY P. GLEAVE 
tor-ney for Defendant 
David L. Mills 
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (63 90) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A. 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L. 
MILLS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID L. MILLS 
Case No. 931600154 
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
David L, Mills, after being duly sworn, states the 
following: 
1) I am one of the Defendants in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2) I involuntarily plead guilty to charges of Attempted 
Riot and Attempt to Injure a Jail, on March 21, 1994. 
3) The reasons my pleas were involuntary are: 
a. The Codefendants were offered as a group a plea 
bargain that by its terms, could only be accepted unanimously by 
all of the Codefendants in this case; and 
b. I felt under extreme pressure from the County 
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Attorney to accept this bargain since it was my understanding 
that he would not permit me to go to trial on the charges alone; 
and 
c. If I had not accepted the plea bargain, I could 
have been exposed to physical and emotional retaliation from one 
of my Codefendants who desired to accept the plea bargain. 
DATED this day of April, 1994. 
David L. Mills 
Affiant 
*Y P. GLEAVE 
-Oifney for Defendant 
North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of April, 
1994. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS and AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. MILLS was hand 
delivered to the following, this /<(' day of April, 1994. 
Ross C. Blackham 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
EXHIBITS 
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
19 5 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID L; MILLS, 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. 931600154 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant and Appellant, David 
L. Mills, by and through his attorney, Jeffery P. Gleave, appeals 
to the Utah Court of Appeals the order of the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea entered 
May 10, 1994. 
DATED this Jj 7' day of May, 1994. 
d&-
*mRY P. GLEAVE 
torney f o r Defendant and 
i p e l l a n t 
CAI1IBII _fe 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM (#0357) 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone! (801) 835-6381 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
A M E N D E D 
VS. * ) I N F O R M A T I O N 
I ' 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL <f. ) Criminal No. 931600154 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY if" EATON, 
MICHAEL A. LAND and DAVID 4pL ) Judge Don V. Tibbs 
MILLS, 
Defendants. ) 
The undersigned Complainant, ROSS C. BLACKHAM, Sanpete County 
Attorney, under oath, states on information and belief that the 
Defendants, at and within Sanpete County, State of Utah, did commit 
the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 - RIOT, a Third Degree Felony 
and charges that: 
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, the Defendants, as parties to the offense, 
did simultaneously with two or more other persons engage in 
tumultuous or violent conduct and thereby knowingly or recklessly 
creates a substantial risk of causing public alarm, or did assemble 
with two or more other persons with the purpose of engaging, soon 
thereafter, in tumultuous or violent conduct, knowing that two or 
more other persons in the assembly have the same purpose and in 
the course of an as a result of Defendants conduct substantial 
property damage or arson occurred or the Defendant was armed with 
a deadly weapon, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Sections 
76-9-101(1)(a)(b) and (3) and 76-2-202. 
Q: fay&u-
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COUNT 2 - POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON AT A CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITY, a Second Degree Felony 
and charges that: 
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, 
County, State of Utah, the Defendants Jeffrey Eaton and 
Bolin, were offenders and did possess at a Correctional 
a dangerous weapon or implement of escape, in violation 
Code Annotated, Section 64-13-35(2)(c ) . 
COUNT 3 - ATTEMPTED ESCAPE, a Thira Degree Felony 
and charges that: 
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, the Defendants Michael Land, and Phillip 
Bolin, did attempt to escape from official custody and confinement 
in the State Prison, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 
76-8-309, 76-4-101 and 76-2-202, 
COUNT 4 - INJURING A JAIL, a Third Degree Felony 
and charges that: 
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, the Defendant David Mills, did willfully 
and intentionally break down, pull down, or otherwise destroy or 
injure a public jail or other place of confinement, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-418 and 76-2-202. 
Sanpete 
Phillip 
Facility 
of Utah 
Information 
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This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Ron Christensen, Doyle Cutler, Lewis Bagnell, 
Scott Johnson, Steve Lund, Troy Morgan, Sandra Nunley, Jerry 
Peterson, Tony Peterson, George Peip and Richard Whimpey. 
DATED this *Z0 day of January, 1994. 
Byi 
f^^Ah^L^-
fOSS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete County Attorney 
EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT "D" 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 11. PLEAS. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to 
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with 
counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant 
to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty 
or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to 
plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court 
shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of 
the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case 
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail 
shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other 
than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of 
the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he 
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-
examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature 
of the of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement 
has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, 
but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding 
on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, 
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for 
it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The 
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be 
approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition 
should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the 
judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the 
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who 
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
EXHIBITX: 
EXHIBIT "E" 
Utah Code Ann *§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
• • • • 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT ,fF" 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 
is made by motion, and shall be made within 30 days after 
the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an 
imprisoned person under Rule 656(1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
EXHIBIT^ 
EXHIBIT "6" 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure/ Rule 11. Pleas 
(e) Plea agreement procedure. (1) • . . . 
(2) Notice of such agreement. If a plea agreement has been 
reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the 
disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good 
cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered 
